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Rip	It	Up	and	Start	Again:	The	rejection	of	a	characterization	of	a	phenomenon	
	
Abstract:	In	this	paper,	I	investigate	the	nature	of	empirical	findings	that	provide	evidence	for	the	characterization	of	a	scientific	phenomenon,	and	the	defeasible	nature	of	this	evidence.		To	do	so,	I	explore	an	exemplary	instance	of	the	rejection	of	a	characterization	of	a	scientific	phenomenon:	memory	transfer.		I	examine	the	reason	why	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer	was	rejected,	and	analyze	how	this	rejection	tied	to	researchers’	failures	to	resolve	experimental	issues	relating	to	replication	and	confounds.		I	criticize	the	presentation	of	the	case	by	Harry	Collins	and	Trevor	Pinch,	who	claim	that	no	sufficient	reason	was	provided	to	abandon	research	on	memory	transfer.		I	argue	that	skeptics	about	memory	transfer	adopted	what	I	call	a	defeater	strategy,	in	which	researchers	exploit	the	defeasibility	of	the	evidence	for	a	characterization	of	a	phenomenon.		
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1.		Introduction		 The	identification	of	phenomena	is	a	critical	scientific	research	activity,	as	it	is	responsible	for	the	discovery	and	characterization	of	the	types	of	events	to	be	explained	by	theory.		To	fulfill	their	theoretical	and	practical	aims,	researchers	set	out	to	accept	characterizations	of	phenomena	when	empirical	findings	are	put	forward	in	their	favor.		When	a	characterization	of	a	phenomenon	is	accepted,	researchers	theorize	and	experiment	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	the	existence	of	the	phenomenon.		However,	many	episodes	in	the	history	of	science	involve	the	abandonment	of	characterizations	of	phenomena	that	were	once	empirically	promising.		This	raises	a	question:	under	what	circumstances	do	researchers	reject	a	characterization	of	a	scientific	phenomenon,	despite	evidence	that	appears	to	support	it?			In	this	paper,	I	analyze	the	rejection	of	a	phenomenon	through	the	lens	of	two	philosophical	topics.		The	first	topic	relates	to	how	empirical	findings	can	serve	as	evidence	for	a	characterized	phenomenon,	and	the	defeasible	nature	of	this	evidence.		The	second	topic	relates	to	the	strategies	through	which	researchers	test	an	existing	characterization	
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of	a	phenomenon.		In	this	paper,	I	investigate	what	I	call	the	defeater	strategy.		A	collection	of	experiments	can	be	used	to	undercut	the	empirical	findings	thought	to	support	the	characterization	of	a	phenomenon.		By	defeating	all	evidence,	any	empirically	motivated	reason	for	accepting	a	phenomenon	as	characterized	is	eliminated.		With	this	strategy,	researchers	do	not	simply	provide	evidence	to	challenge	a	characterization	of	the	phenomenon;	they	also	demonstrate	the	faultiness	of	the	experiments	whose	findings	are	thought	to	support	the	characterization.	I	explore	a	case	in	which	the	characterization	of	a	phenomenon	was	rejected:	the	research	on	memory	transfer.		This	alleged	phenomenon	was	described	as	the	transfer	of	learned	behavior	by	the	insertion	of	tissue	from	a	trained	donor	organism	to	an	untrained	receiver.		It	received	a	great	deal	of	attention	from	scientists	and	the	public	alike,	due	to	its	implications	and	to	researchers’	use	of	sensational	experiments	involving	cannibalism.		Formulated	and	defended	in	light	of	empirical	findings,	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer	was	considered	by	some	to	be	accurate;	this	led	to	a	cottage	industry	about	its	characterization,	its	theoretical	significance,	and	its	underlying	mechanisms.		The	research	program	was	abandoned,	and	contemporary	scientists	generally	consider	the	“phenomenon”	to	not	exist.			The	case	of	memory	transfer	has	generated	controversy	in	the	history	and	philosophy	of	science.		Sociologists	and	historians	of	science	have	questioned	the	motives	of	the	scientific	community	that	abandoned	research	on	memory	transfer.		For	instance,	Harry	Collins	and	Trevor	Pinch	argue	that	there	was	no	“decisive	technical	evidence”	that	disproved	the	existence	of	memory	transfer,	and	that	research	was	abandoned	due	to	disinterest	in	the	purported	phenomenon	(1998,	25).		Collins	and	Pinch	present	a	powerful	
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challenge	to	the	alleged	justification	researchers	had	in	rejecting	memory	transfer.		They	argue	that	there	were	deficiencies	in	the	evidence	put	forward	in	opposition	to	memory	transfer,	and	there	is	a	discrepancy	between	the	perceived	decisiveness	of	evidence	in	opposition	to	memory	transfer	and	the	actual	decisiveness	of	this	evidence.		They	base	their	challenge	on	the	fact	that	no	evidence	against	memory	transfer	applies	to	all	experiments	whose	findings	were	thought	to	provide	support	for	the	characterization	of	the	alleged	phenomenon.			Collins	and	Pinch’s	challenge	is,	at	its	core,	one	about	the	evidence	required	to	reject	a	characterization	of	a	phenomenon:	they	argue	that	there	was	no	decisive	evidence	for	the	abandonment	of	research	on	memory	transfer.		I	argue	that	the	evidence	provided	against	memory	transfer	was	decisive	for	the	rejection	of	the	characterization	of	the	alleged	phenomenon.		The	only	way	to	understand	why	there	was	decisive	evidence,	I	argue,	is	to	recognize	the	fact	that	scientific	evidence	is	defeasible,	and	the	defeat	of	evidence	for	memory	transfer	eliminated	all	reason	to	accept	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer.		By	exploiting	this	fact,	the	defeater	strategy	provides	a	way	to	undermine	evidence	in	favor	of	scientific	claims,	including	characterizations	of	phenomena.		 I	will	proceed	as	follows.		In	Section	2,	I	introduce	the	process	of	identifying	phenomena,	and	discuss	how	empirical	findings	can	serve	as	defeasible	evidence	for	the	characterization	of	a	phenomenon.		In	Section	3,	I	present	three	projects	in	which	researchers	attempted	to	provide	evidence	for	memory	transfer.		In	3.1,	I	examine	the	work	of	James	McConnell	on	planarians.		I	continue	in	3.2	with	the	development	of	memory	research	in	mammals.		In	3.3,	I	discuss	the	work	of	Georges	Ungar.		For	each	project,	I	review	the	dissenting	opinions	in	the	scientific	community	at	the	time.		In	Section	4,	I	
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analyze	why	researchers	were	justified	in	abandoning	memory	transfer.		I	discuss	the	defeater	strategy,	which	was	used	to	test	the	accuracy	of	the	characterization	of	this	alleged	phenomenon.		This	strategy	applies	to	the	case	of	memory	transfer,	but	has	the	potential	to	be	applied	to	other	instances	of	scientific	practice	as	well.		With	an	account	of	this	strategy,	I	rebut	the	claims	about	memory	transfer	presented	by	Collins	and	Pinch.		
2.	Identifying	a	Scientific	Phenomenon	
	 When	researchers	identify	a	scientific	phenomenon,	what	is	it	that	they	identify?		For	this	paper,	a	scientific	phenomenon	is	a	type	of	event	whose	characteristics	exhibit	repeatability	and	stability	(Bogen	&	Woodward	1988).		This	distinguishes	phenomena	from	data,	which	are	the	empirical	findings	collected	in	experiments	that	are	used	to	infer	the	characteristics	of	a	phenomenon.		Phenomena	are	discovered	in	the	world	or	created	in	the	laboratory	(Hacking	1983,	221).		Researchers	aim	to	measure	the	features	of	phenomena	that	manifest	in	observational	or	experimental	contexts,	and	use	their	empirical	findings	to	accurately	describe	them	by	characterizing	the	features	of	their	manifestations	and	the	conditions	under	which	they	occur.		Accepting	a	characterization	of	a	phenomenon	amounts	to	accepting	that	the	phenomenon	as	characterized	occurs.		Conversely,	rejecting	this	characterization	amounts	to	rejecting	that	a	phenomenon	occurs	in	the	way	that	it	is	characterized.	Characterizing	phenomena	is	important	for	scientific	practice.		Theories	are	tested	against	the	phenomena	that	are	discovered	or	created;	researchers	seek	to	determine	if	the	predictions	they	derive	from	their	theories	correspond	to	the	phenomena	they	characterize	(Bogen	and	Woodward	1988).		In	addition,	characterizing	a	phenomenon	“guides	the	
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construction”	of	hypotheses	for	the	investigation	of	mechanisms	and	aids	in	the	construction	of	theoretical	models	(Craver	&	Darden	2013,	52;	see	also	Woodward	2003).			The	identification	of	scientific	phenomena	is	a	process	through	which	researchers	discover	and	accurately	characterize	a	phenomenon	of	interest.		At	the	start,	researchers	record	the	features	constitutive	of	a	phenomenon	from	instances	of	its	occurrence.		To	evaluate	this	initial	characterization	of	a	phenomenon,	researchers	produce	the	set	of	characterized	features	in	the	same	and	different	contexts,	to	determine	the	conditions	under	which	these	features	co-occur.		These	strategies	allow	the	researchers	to	determine	the	features	that	constitute	the	phenomenon	of	interest,	as	well	as	the	conditions	that	precipitate,	inhibit,	and	modulate	its	occurrence	(Craver	&	Darden	2013,	Chapter	4).		When	accurate,	a	characterization	of	a	phenomenon	corresponds	to	a	general	type	of	event,	which	occurs	in	the	instances	in	which	the	experimental	data	were	collected.		If	findings	that	support	the	characterization	are	produced,	there	is	reason	to	accept	that	this	phenomenon	occurs	and	its	characterization	is	accurate.		This	is	because	researchers	take	the	findings	to	be	causally	related	to	the	occurrence	of	an	instance	of	the	phenomenon.			Empirical	findings	provide	evidential	support	for	a	characterization	of	a	phenomenon,	but	this	evidence	is	defeasible.		Findings	that	serve	as	evidence	for	a	characterization	of	a	phenomenon	do	not	entail	its	accuracy.		The	evidential	status	of	findings	may	alter	if	additional	findings	are	collected.		Certain	findings,	known	as	defeaters,	provide	reason	to	think	that	the	initial	findings	do	not	provide	evidence	for	the	characterization	of	the	phenomenon.		If	evidence	is	defeated,	it	no	longer	provides	reason	to	accept	the	characterization	of	a	phenomenon.		This	depiction	of	defeasibility	hints	at	a	strategy	that	researchers	can	adopt:	if	researchers	sever	the	relationship	between	findings	
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and	the	characterization	of	the	phenomenon	the	findings	are	thought	to	provide	evidence	for,	they	provide	reason	to	no	longer	accept	it.		Undefeated	evidence	is	required	to	accept	a	characterization	of	a	phenomenon,	and	researchers	can	actively	seek	to	defeat	evidence	in	order	to	provide	reason	to	reject	it.		This	strategy,	which	I	call	the	defeater	strategy,	played	a	crucial	role	in	the	abandonment	of	research	on	memory	transfer.	An	alternative	strategy	to	provide	reason	to	reject	a	characterization	of	a	phenomenon	is	to	develop	new	experiments	whose	findings	provide	evidence	of	the	inaccuracy	of	the	characterization.		However,	this	strategy	presents	an	additional	challenge:	evidence	against	a	characterization	of	a	phenomenon	does	not	cause	any	evidence	for	it	to	lose	its	epistemic	status.		To	dismiss	findings	as	evidence	for	a	characterization	of	a	phenomenon,	researchers	must	formulate	an	alternative	hypothesis,	inconsistent	with	the	characterization	of	a	phenomenon	in	question,	which	is	better	supported	by	the	sum	of	the	reported	findings.		In	research	on	memory	transfer,	this	kind	of	strategy	was	not	used.		This	is	because,	as	I	will	illustrate,	there	is	no	single	reason	why	researchers	produced	findings	they	thought	supported	memory	transfer	as	characterized.				
3.		Memory	Transfer		 Research	on	memory	transfer	developed	out	of	research	on	learning	in	planarian	worms	in	the	1950s,	with	a	report	of	a	transfer	effect	in	1962.		By	the	end	of	the	1970s,	most	researchers	agreed	that	the	phenomenon	did	not	exist.		In	this	section,	I	track	memory	transfer	research	through	three	research	projects	(see	Appendix	for	a	table	of	articles	that	support	or	challenge	memory	transfer).		Rather	than	present	a	strict	temporal	ordering	of	the	projects,	I	present	them	based	on	their	research	questions	and	character	of	
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the	controversy	surrounding	them.		I	start	with	the	work	by	McConnell	on	planarians.		I	then	discuss	research	on	mammals	by	the	Fjerdingstad	group,	the	Jacobson	group,	and	the	Rosenblatt	group.		I	finish	by	discussing	Ungar’s	research	on	memory	transfer	and	its	underlying	mechanism.		I	do	not	intend	to	provide	an	exhaustive	history	of	the	case.		Rather,	I	focus	on	the	researchers	who	contemporaries	and	historians	agree	played	the	most	significant	role	in	the	discovery,	characterization,	theorization,	explanation,	and	defense	of	memory	transfer,	and	demonstrate	how,	in	each	set	of	research	projects,	there	were	unresolved	experimental	issues	(Irwin	1978;	Travis	1981;	Setlow	1997).			 The	research	on	memory	transfer	was	driven	by	experiment.		The	major	proponents	of	memory	transfer	were	experimentalists,	who	did	not	develop	a	characterization	of	the	phenomenon	in	light	of	a	well-established	theory	of	memory.		Instead,	research	was	based	on	speculations	from	earlier	experimental	findings.		While	the	research	was	informed	by	background	theory	on	memory,	experiment,	rather	than	theory,	drove	subsequent	experimentation.		Thus,	rejecting	memory	transfer	was	not	considered	to	entail	the	refutation	of	an	otherwise	successful	theory	that	predicted	its	occurrence.		Each	memory	transfer	experiment	shares	a	protocol	template.		This	template	is	as	follows:	
Donor	Training:	An	organism	is	trained	to	display	a	behavior	consistent	with	the	association	of	stimuli,	which	indicates	that	the	organism	has	learned.			
	
Transfer	from	Donor	to	Receiver:	Tissue	is	excised	from	the	donor	organism,	and	inserted	into	the	receiving	organism.	
	
Receiver	Training:	The	receiving	organism	is	trained	following	a	learning	paradigm.		Researchers	determine	if	the	receiver	demonstrates	the	behavior	consistent	with	having	the	memory,	or	learns	more	quickly	than	an	organism	that	has	not	received	tissue	from	the	donor.				
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Thus,	in	a	memory	transfer	experiment,	there	must	be	an	associative	memory,	and	there	must	be	a	transfer	of	that	memory,	which	allows	the	receiver	to	do	something	that	could	not	be	achieved	without	having	that	memory.		Debate	over	memory	transfer	revolved	around	two	kinds	of	issues	with	the	experiments	whose	findings	were	thought	to	serve	as	evidence	for	the	characterization	of	the	phenomenon.		The	first	was	the	failures	to	replicate	the	results.		These	failures	occur	when	researchers	are	unable	to	reproduce	the	findings	reported	by	the	supporters	of	the	alleged	phenomenon,	despite	reproducing	the	reported	conditions	of	the	original	experiment.		The	second	was	the	identification	of	confounds.		In	the	present	context,	a	
confound	is	any	feature	not	included	in	the	characterization	of	the	phenomenon	that	plays	a	role	in	producing	the	empirical	findings	in	the	phenomenon’s	purported	experimental	demonstration.				
3.1.	McConnell	and	the	Worms		 Research	on	memory	transfer	developed	from	research	on	the	planarian	as	a	model	organism	for	neural	experimentation.		With	Robert	Thompson,	McConnell	putatively	demonstrated	that	planarians	could	be	classically	conditioned	(1955).		To	demonstrate	conditioning,	an	organism	must	display	behavior	consistent	with	the	association	of	an	unconditioned	stimulus	and	a	conditioned	stimulus,	following	tandem	presentation	of	the	stimuli	to	the	organism.		This	amounts	to	the	organism	displaying	a	behavioral	response	to	the	unconditioned	stimulus	when	the	conditioned	stimulus	is	presented.		Thompson	and	McConnell	had	the	unconditioned	and	conditioned	stimuli	played	by	electrical	shock	and	light	exposure	respectively:	each	planarian	was	trained	to	react	to	light	exposure,	with	its	
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unconditioned	reaction	to	electrical	stimulation.		These	empirical	findings	indicated	that	planarians	were	capable	of	acquiring	memories,	which	would	make	them	amongst	the	simplest	organisms	known	to	be	able	to	do	this.			 The	conditioning	paradigm	filled	the	Donor	Training	step	of	the	protocol	template.		In	the	study,	the	planarians	were	divided	into	four	groups:	An	experimental	group	(which	received	conditioned	and	unconditioned	stimuli),	a	light	control	group	(which	received	only	conditioned	stimulus),	a	shock	control	group	(which	received	only	unconditioned	stimulus),	and	a	control	group	(which	received	neither	stimulus).		Following	their	exposure	to	the	stimulus	(or	lack	thereof),	the	researchers	observed	the	behaviors	of	the	planarians.		Only	members	of	the	experimental	group	demonstrated	a	significant	increase	in	the	number	of	behavioral	responses.		Organisms	in	this	group	received	a	three-second	light	stimulus,	in	which	their	behavior	was	recorded	during	the	first	two	seconds,	and	they	were	shocked	during	the	last	second.		That	they	engaged	in	the	behaviors	associated	with	the	shock	when	exposed	to	the	light	only	suggests	that	they	had	learned	to	associate	the	stimuli.				 With	a	learning	paradigm	developed,	McConnell	began	to	investigate	if	a	planarian	would	retain	its	memory	following	segmentation	and	regeneration	of	its	body	(McConnell	1965).		Planarians	regenerate	if	cut	transversely:	each	half	will	grow	back	a	head	or	tail	to	result	in	two	distinct	bodies.		The	researchers	determined	that	if	the	planarians	were	trained	to	demonstrate	the	conditioned	response,	then	cut	in	half	and	allowed	to	regenerate,	each	new	planarian	demonstrated	the	conditioned	response	(McConnell,	Jacobson,	&	Kimble	1959).		This	was	considered	remarkable.		Neural	structures	are	largely	absent	in	the	planarian	tail,	and	were	regrown	after	segmentation;	it	was	“as	if	their	new	
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brains	were	created	with	the	old	‘learning’	already	‘wired	in’”	(McConnell	1965,	6).		These	findings	sparked	considerable	debate,	and	led	McConnell	to	develop	a	journal	dedicated	to	planarians,	called	the	Worm	Runner’s	Digest.		Though	the	journal	included	poems,	comics,	and	facetious	articles	as	part	of	McConnell’s	desire	to	introduce	zaniness	into	an	austere	scientific	community	(Travis	1981),	the	journal	also	included	serious	papers,	including	the	article	that	presented	the	first	characterization	of	memory	transfer.	If	planarians	could	regenerate	memories,	McConnell	speculated	that	“the	‘engram’	must	be	stored	throughout	the	planarian’s	body”,	and	these	‘engrams’	might	be	transferrable	between	organisms	(McConnell	1965,	6).		To	determine	if	transference	was	possible,	he	developed	an	infamous	protocol	that	exploited	the	cannibalistic	nature	of	planarians:	We	trained	some	‘victim’	worms	to	criterion	(using	the	now-standard	light/shock	conditioning	technique).		We	then	fed	the	trained	victims	to	starved,	untrained	cannibals.		At	the	same	time,	a	set	of	untrained	‘victim’	worms	was	fed	to	a	different	group	of	cannibals.		Both	sets	of	cannibals	were	then	given	light/shock	training.		The	results	were	clear-cut:	the	cannibals	that	had	ingested	‘trained’	victims	were,	on	the	very	first	day	of	training,	significantly	superior	to	the	cannibals	that	had	eaten	untrained	animals	(McConnell	1965,	7).		First	published	in	the	Worm	Runner’s	Digest	in	1961,	then	in	the	Journal	of	Neuropsychiatry	in	1962,	‘Memory	transfer	through	cannibalism	in	planarians’	includes	the	first	characterization	of	memory	transfer:	“Learning	seems	to	be	transferrable	from	one	animal	to	another	via	cannibalistic	ingestion”	(McConnell	1962,	S48).		The	characterization	includes	specific	features	of	the	experiment,	but	indicates	the	generalizability	of	the	type	of	memory	event.		Through	the	cannibalistic	transfer	of	tissue,	the	memories	of	the	donor	organism	are	transferred	to	the	receiving	organism.		
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The	characterization	of	the	phenomenon	and	the	learning	paradigm	both	drew	controversy.		Failures	to	replicate	the	learning	in	planarians	were	reported	(Bennett	&	Calvin	1964).		Confounds	were	also	reported.		Researchers	suggested	that	McConnell	may	not	have	demonstrated	associative	learning,	and	that	the	protocol	instead	may	provoke	the	response	of	sensitization	(Halas,	James,	&	Stone	1961).		Sensitization	is	non-associative,	so	it	is	not	the	kind	of	learning	McConnell	had	depicted	in	his	characterization	of	memory	transfer.		If	light	provoked	a	response	–	a	circumstance	McConnell	attempted	to	control	for	with	the	light	control	group	–	then	the	experiment	would	not	have	shown	the	association	of	the	stimuli.		Skeptical	researchers	found	“a	significant	difference	between	[the	light	control	group]	and	[the	normal	response	control	group]”	(Halas,	James,	&	Knutson	1964,	791).			They	state	that	there	is	“no	adequate	explanation	for	this	discrepancy	other	than	to	point	out	that	there	was	a	trend	toward	a	significant	difference	between	these	groups	in	the	Thompson	and	McConnell	study”:	they	point	out	that	McConnell’s	1962	article	references	a	non-significant	increase	in	behavioral	responses	in	the	light	control	group,	suggesting	that	planarians	may	be	responding	to	light	as	though	it	were	an	unconditioned	stimulus	(Halas,	James,	&	Knutson	1964,	791).		Other	researchers	criticized	McConnell’s	protocol	in	his	1962	article.		Researchers	demonstrated	a	significant	relationship	between	the	shocking	of	planarians	and	their	light	response,	but	that	this	relationship	was	due	to	the	fact	that	the	cannibal	planarians	had	ingested	shocked	tissue	(Walker	&	Milton	1966).		Researchers	were	able	to	demonstrate	behaviors	consistent	with	McConnell’s	results,	without	training	the	donor	worms.		This	criticism	was	extended	by	research	in	which	conditioning	was	extinguished	–	that	is,	the	association	was	formed	through	training	and	then	dissociated	through	further	training	
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(Walker	1966).		There	was	no	significant	difference	in	the	behavior	between	the	worms	that	had	consumed	tissue	from	conditioned	planarians,	when	compared	to	those	that	had	been	conditioned	and	then	extinguished.			 Thus,	McConnell’s	research	was	undermined	for	two	reasons.		First,	his	findings	had	failed	to	replicate,	raising	concerns	for	the	characterization	of	McConnell’s	experimental	conditions.		As	critic	Edward	Bennett	states,	no	one	could	“point	to	a	100%	procedural	replication”,	which	made	it	“impossible	in	the	absence	of	further	experiments	to	determine	if	the	relevant	factors	necessary	for	reproducible	and	reliable	training	of	planarians	have	been	described”	(1970,	150).		Second,	several	research	groups	provided	reasons	to	suspect	the	protocol	did	not	have	the	sophistication	to	rule	out	confounds	like	sensitization.		This	meant	that	McConnell’s	experimental	findings	were	equivocal	between	demonstrating	memory	transfer	and	demonstrating	an	effect	of	a	very	different	kind.		Consequently,	empirical	challenges	defeated	the	evidence	McConnell	provided	for	his	characterization	of	memory	transfer.			
3.2.	The	Inclusion	of	Mammals	and	The	Theorization	of	Memory	Transfer		 Following	popularization	by	McConnell,	other	researchers	became	interested	in	memory	transfer.		Respecting	the	issues	of	McConnell’s	experiments,	rodents	were	used	“to	avoid	any	discussion	of	whether...	[the]	experimental	subjects	could	learn”,	and	to	determine	if	“the	phenomenon	would	prove	so	general	as	to	be	found	in	mammals”	(Fjerdingstad	1971,	xvi-xvii).		Following	the	transition	to	mammals,	several	research	groups	putatively	demonstrated	memory	transfer.		However,	given	that	a	principal	question	posed	to	researchers	was	“Does	the	phenomenon	really	exist…?”,	it	is	clear	that	
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the	studies	were	contentious	(Fjerdingstad	1971,	xiv).		I	discuss	three	groups	that	investigated	memory	transfer	in	mammals:	Fjerdingstad’s	group,	Jacobson’s	group,	and	Rosenblatt’s	group.			Following	up	on	a	pilot	study	that	appeared	to	demonstrate	memory	transfer,	researchers	in	the	laboratory	of	Enjar	Fjerdingstad	developed	a	protocol	to	investigate	transfer	in	mammals	(Nissen,	Røigaard-Petersen,	&	Fjerdingstad	1965).		Rats	were	trained	via	a	reinforcement	paradigm,	meaning	that	the	organisms	behave	consistently	with	the	association	of	a	behavior	and	a	reward	stimulus.		Following	training,	their	brains	were	extracted	using	a	phenol	solution,	chemically	treated	in	an	isopropanol	solution,	and	injected	into	receiving	organisms.		The	chemical	treatment	increased	the	concentration	of	the	RNA	from	the	tissue,	a	possible	chemical	substrate	for	memory	transfer.		Their	experiment	followed	the	protocol	template:	donor	rats	were	conditioned	either	to	light	or	to	darkness.		Receiving	rats	were	injected	with	tissue	from	light-conditioned	or	dark-conditioned	rats,	and	then	were	trained	to	reinforce	dark	preference	or	light	preference.		The	publication	reports	a	significant	difference	between	the	learning	quickness	of	rats	injected	with	light-condition	donor	tissue	and	those	who	were	injected	with	dark-conditioned	donor	tissue.		However,	the	direction	of	difference	is	the	opposite	of	what	was	predicted:	light-conditioned	rats	gave	better	performance	under	reinforcement	of	dark	preference	and	vice	versa.		This	‘reversal	effect’	is	inconsistent	with	the	association	of	behavior	and	reward.		Individual	differences	of	rats	and	“specific	inhibitory	effects”	are	cited	as	potential	explanations	for	the	reversal	effect	(Nissen,	Røigaard-Petersen,	&	Fjerdingstad	1965,	271).		
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Concurrent	with	this	research,	members	of	the	laboratory	of	Allan	Jacobson	began	to	investigate	memory	transfer.		The	researchers	used	a	Skinnerian	training	paradigm	to	teach	rats	to	associate	clicking	sounds	with	a	behavior:	rats	would	approach	a	food	bowl	when	a	click	occurred,	even	if	there	was	no	food	in	the	bowl	(Babich	et	al.	1965).		Once	learning	was	established,	the	rats’	brains	were	extracted	and	then	injected	into	rats	in	an	experimental	group.		The	researchers	also	included	a	control,	with	untrained	donor	chemicals	being	injected	into	a	group	of	rats.		When	comparing	the	behavior	of	the	experimental	and	control	groups,	there	was	a	significant	difference	in	the	tendency	the	rats	had	to	approach	the	bowl	when	the	clicking	occurred.		This	study	was	reproduced,	and	the	findings	were	replicated.		The	receiving	organisms	did	not	need	to	undergo	training	to	display	the	behavior;	they	simply	‘had’	the	memory	following	the	injection.			Researchers	in	the	laboratory	of	Frank	Rosenblatt	also	began	to	study	memory	transfer.		Reproducing	Jacobson’s	protocol,	Rosenblatt	and	colleagues	reproduced	the	experiment	and	replicated	the	findings	consistent	with	memory	transfer	(Rosenblatt,	Farrow,	&	Herblin	1966a).		In	addition	to	a	direct	replication,	the	researchers	also	modified	the	Donor	Training	step	of	the	protocol	template,	and	showed	that	associations	formed	by	different	training	paradigms	could	be	transferred.		However,	the	researchers	also	uncovered	individual	differences	within	their	subject	population.		They	state	that	“it	appeared	from	these	data	that	the	injection	had	‘taken’	on	some	of	the	rats,	but	not	on	others”	(Rosenblatt,	Farrow,	&	Herblin	1966b,	48).		In	another	replication	of	Jacobson,	the	laboratory	researchers	confirmed	issues	with	the	injection	‘taking’:	“we	find	repeated	examples	of	this	phenomenon”,	and,	though	“the	reasons…	are	still	subject	to	speculation”,	the	authors	include	variation	of	dosage,	subjects’	sensitivity	to	the	extract,	and	“the	transfer	
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of	an	adaptation	effect	which	tends	to	reduce	activity	that	would	otherwise	result	from	normal	curiosity”	as	potential	explanations	for	the	individual	differences	in	the	subjects’	behavior	(Rosenblatt,	Farrow,	&	Rhine	1965,	553-554).				 Despite	complications,	Rosenblatt	states	that	his	experiments	convinced	him	“that	the	phenomenon	of	‘memory	transfer’	is	a	real	one,	which	must	be	taken	into	account	in	any	theoretical	approach	to	biological	memory”	(1967,	34).		However,	given	the	lack	of	evidence	about	the	chemistry	that	underlies	transfer,	he	suggests	that	“it	must	be	recognized	that	we	are,	in	fact,	entering	the	realm	of	science	fiction;	the	present	experiments,	although	suggestive,	leave	us	completely	in	doubt	as	to	the	mechanism	at	work”	(Rosenblatt	1967,	34).		Thus,	Rosenblatt	accepted	the	characterization,	even	with	no	knowledge	of	what	mechanistic	details	might	underwrite	memory	transfer’s	occurrence.		With	no	evidence	for	the	mechanism,	Rosenblatt	admits	that	any	effort	to	model	what	causally	underwrites	memory	transfer	amounts	to	speculation.		This	frustrated	more	eager	modelers,	with	one	saying	that	“we	are	inclined	to	feel	that	it	is	no	more	science	fiction	than	was,	for	example,	Einstein’s	derivation	of	his	famous	E=mc2	relation	at	a	time	when	there	was	not	a	single	shred	of	experimental	evidence	for	it”	(Rashevsky	1968,	342).		Modelers	who	were	convinced	of	memory	transfer	modeled	it,	and	assumed	that	subsequent	research	would	vindicate	their	models.	The	empirical	results	of	these	groups	were	questioned	during	this	time.		In	an	18-experiment	replication	performed	by	researchers	in	a	number	of	different	laboratories,	there	was	failure	to	replicate	the	memory	transfer	phenomenon	in	a	direct	reproduction	of	Jacobson’s	protocol	(Byrne	et	al.	1966).		The	failures	suggest	complications	with	Jacobson’s	protocol	–	and,	by	implication,	Rosenblatt’s	protocol	–	though	the	authors	state	that	“it	
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would	be	unfortunate	if	these	negative	findings	were	to	be	taken	as	a	signal	for	abandoning	pursuit	of”	memory	transfer,	as	“failure	to	reproduce	results	is	not,	after	all,	unusual	in	the	early	phase	of	research	when	all	relevant	variables	are	as	yet	unspecified”	(Byrne	et	al.	1966,	658).		Thus,	the	failures	to	replicate	provided	reason	to	think	that	Jacobson’s	findings	could	not	serve	as	evidence	for	memory	transfer.		However,	those	who	worked	on	memory	transfer	continued	to	iterate	their	practices,	to	develop	an	experiment	that	did	not	include	confounds	and	could	be	replicated.	Responding	to	the	confounds	identified	in	their	previous	work	and	the	failures	to	replicate,	Fjerdingstad	and	colleagues	modified	their	protocol	“in	order	to	make	the	‘transfer	effect’	more	reproducible”,	which	was	“considered	to	be	of	primary	importance	before	further	experiments	concerning	the	degree	of	specificity	of	this	effect	and	[its]	exact	chemical	nature”	(Røigaard-Petersen,	Nissen,	&	Fjerdingstad	1968,	1).		To	control	for	the	individual	differences	of	the	organisms,	the	researchers	picked	only	rats	that	were	explorative.		Fjerdingstad	and	colleagues	developed	a	novel	light-dark	reinforcement	experiment.		Prior	to	injection,	the	researchers	kept	the	chemicals	at	consistent	temperatures,	to	control	for	any	damage	that	may	occur	to	the	chemical	under	improper	holding	conditions.		While	the	researchers	report	some	effect	on	learning	from	the	injection	of	control	organisms	–	those	injected	with	tissue	from	donors	who	were	not	trained	–	when	compared	to	noninjected	ones,	they	report	a	significant	difference	between	the	learning	of	the	experimental	and	control	injected	groups.			However,	the	researchers	replicated	the	reversal	effect	–	the	rats	with	the	dark	reinforcement	injections	demonstrated	improved	light	behavior,	and	vice	versa	–	which	is	likely	why	the	researchers	mention	that	their	findings	“must	therefore	be	interpreted	with	
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some	reservation	until	these	relations	have	been	further	investigated”	(Røigaard-Petersen,	Niseen,	&	Fjerdingstad	1968,	12).		The	researchers	again	cite	individual	differences	of	the	experimental	organisms	and	inhibitory	effects	as	potential	explanations	for	the	reversal	effect.		They	did	not	rule	out	confounds	related	to	inhibitory	effects,	even	though	their	results	suggest	that	something	that	is	not	specified	in	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer	likely	played	a	role	in	their	experiments.			In	response	to	the	failures	to	replicate,	the	researchers	state	the	following:	During	the	last	year	the	proportion	of	the	number	of	‘positive’	to	the	number	of	‘negative’	reports	seems	to	have	changed.		No	doubt	this	is	due	to	the	realization	of	the	potential	importance	of	even	seemingly	trivial	variables,	both	of	behavioral	methods,	extraction	and	injection.		Too	little	attention	to	these	factors	characterize	[sic]	many	of	the	early	negative	reports	(Røigaard-Petersen,	Niseen,	&	Fjerdingstad	1968,	14).				While	the	researchers	do	not	make	clear	which	factors	the	negative	reports	missed,	their	intent	is	clear:	negative	reports,	but	not	positive	ones,	fail	to	take	into	account	key	experimental	features.		It	is	due	to	this	issue	with	the	negative	reports,	they	suggest,	that	replication	does	not	occur.			 Thus,	the	three	laboratory	groups	were	unable	to	resolve	issues	relating	to	replication	failures	or	confounds.		Many	were	unable	to	replicate	the	findings	presented	by	the	supporters.		This	was	summed	up	in	the	comments	from	one	critic	that	“it	is	essential	that	several	laboratories	can	replicate	and	extend	the	primary	observations”	(Bennett	1970,	150).		Critics	did	not	accept	the	speculation	that	confounds	were	responsible	for	only	failures	to	replicate.		Furthermore,	the	supporters	did	not	address	which	features	of	their	experiment	led	to	the	inconsistent	findings	presented	by	Fjerdingstad	and	colleagues.		For	these	reasons,	the	findings	were	not	taken	by	the	community	to	evidentially	support	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer.	
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3.3.	Ungar,	Mammals,	and	the	Mechanism	of	Memory	Transfer		 One	other	researcher	was	a	key	investigator	of	memory	transfer	in	mammals.		Georges	Ungar	started	working	on	memory	transfer	with	the	investigation	of	the	transfer	of	habituation	from	mice	to	rats.		In	this	experiment,	the	Donor	Training	involved	exposing	the	donor	organisms	to	a	stimulus	that	would	elicit	a	startle	response	in	the	organism	(Ungar	&	Oceguera-Navarro	1965).		Once	the	donor	organisms	were	acclimated	to	the	stimulus,	they	were	killed	and	their	tissue	was	transferred.		Along	with	this,	a	control	group	was	injected	with	the	brains	from	naïve	organisms.		Following	injection,	the	researchers	report	a	significant	difference	in	the	habituation	rates	of	the	two	groups,	with	the	experimental	group	habituating	much	more	quickly.		This	led	Ungar	to	investigate	associative	learning.			In	his	research,	Ungar	typically	exposed	the	experimental	injection	to	a	battery	of	chemical	reactions,	and,	from	this,	determined	that	a	key	component	of	the	injection	was	a	protein	or	peptide	chain.		As	such,	he	took	failures	to	replicate	memory	transfer	(such	as	Byrne	et	al.	1966)	to	be	irrelevant	to	his	work,	as	Byrne	and	colleagues	did	not	concentrate	peptides.		However,	he	explained	the	previous	successes	by	Jacobson’s	group	to	be	due	to	poor	design,	and	the	failure	to	remove	peptides	from	their	injection.			Ungar	continued	to	perform	experiments	to	determine	the	specificity	of	the	transfer	of	associated	memory.		With	a	publication	that	summed	up	his	research,	Ungar	concluded	that	he	had	produced	sufficient	evidence	for	the	phenomenon’s	existence	(Ungar	1970).		The	features	relating	to	chemical	composition,	dose,	interval	between	injection	and	testing	
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of	receivers,	and	duration	of	donor	training	were	taken	by	supporters	to	be	features	that	had	not	been	controlled	for	in	failures	to	replicate.		However,	Ungar	also	states:	The	reliability	of	the	method	is	limited	because	of	the	multiplicity	of	the	factors	determining	success	and	failure.		The	experience	accumulated	in	the	last	five	years	in	many	laboratories	explains	most	of	the	past	failures	(1970,	162).				This	hedging	of	claims	about	memory	transfer	came	at	the	same	time	as	another	series	of	failures	to	replicate:	one	in	a	new	experimental	context	(Krech	&	Bennett	1971),	and	the	other	a	direct	replication	of	Ungar’s	protocol	(Goldstein,	Sheenan,	&	Goldstein	1971).		With	critics	demanding	“an	experimental	procedure	which	will	yield	consistently	positive	results	in	the	hands	of	all	qualified	experimenters	and	in	different	laboratories”,	skeptics	would	not	settle	for	“weak	positive	answers,	only	fitfully	obtained,	and	only	among	a	chosen	few	experimenters”	(Krech	&	Bennett	1971,	161).		For	skeptics	to	endorse	Ungar’s	results,	he	had	to	produce	a	more	sophisticated	experiment,	or	else	modify	his	characterization	of	memory	transfer.				 To	convince	the	skeptics,	Ungar	developed	a	large	sample	study	to	demonstrate	the	phenomenon	(Ungar,	Desiderio,	&	Parr	1972).		Training	rats	and	mice	on	dark	avoidance,	the	project	involved	4000	experimental	subjects	trained	on	the	paradigm,	whose	brains	were	then	prepared	to	isolate	a	peptide.		Ungar	believed	this	peptide	to	underwrite	associative	memory,	and	further	believed	its	isolation	and	transmission	from	one	organism	to	another	via	injection	to	be	the	mechanism	underwriting	memory	transfer.		The	researchers	report	a	significant	difference	in	the	dark-avoidance	behaviors	of	the	experimental	group	from	both	the	group	that	received	injections	from	untrained	donors,	and	those	who	received	no	injections	at	all.		Individual	differences	between	the	subjects	are	not	reported,	nor	are	controls	on	the	experimental	protocol	except	when	relating	to	the	
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development	and	transfer	of	the	peptide	chemical.		There	was	no	investigation	of	the	issues	with	previous	memory	transfer	experiments.			 Ungar’s	1972	article	was	published	with	commentary	from	the	reviewer	Walter	Stewart,	as	Ungar	was	not	able	to	satisfy	Stewart’s	reservations	with	the	experiment.		Stewart	agreed	that	Ungar	demonstrated	the	synthesis	of	the	peptide	that	could	potentially	causally	underwrite	the	alleged	phenomenon,	but	that	isolation	of	the	brain	material	from	the	rodents	was	“so	grave…	that	the	authors’	conclusions	are	more	likely	false	than	true”	(Stewart	1972,	209).		Furthermore,	Stewart	raises	concerns	about	whether	or	not	“the	bioassay	[can]	be	successfully	repeated	outside	of	[Ungar’s]	laboratory”,	and	what	conditions	are	“necessary	to	minimize	its	variability”	(Stewart	1972,	209).		In	his	commentary,	Stewart	challenges	Ungar	to	reproduce	the	phenomenon	and	have	other	laboratories	successfully	use	his	protocol.		He	also	mentions	that	Ungar’s	protocol	is	quite	different	from	previous	research,	resulting	in	a	worry	that	Ungar	has	not	demonstrated	if	his	work	relates	to	previous	successes	and	failures	to	demonstrate	memory	transfer.		Ungar	was	never	able	to	meet	Stewart’s	challenge.		He	was	never	able	to	develop	a	protocol	in	which	he	or	anyone	else	could	consistently	demonstrate	memory	transfer.		This	failure,	in	result,	led	researchers	to	not	accept	that	he	had	provided	evidence	for	the	alleged	phenomenon.		
3.4.	Aftermath		 No	supporter	of	memory	transfer	was	able	to	provide	a	clear	characterization	of	the	phenomenon	and	the	conditions	under	which	it	occurs.		While	modelers	theorized	about	the	phenomenon’s	implications,	and	experimentalists	investigated	its	underlying	
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biochemical	mechanisms,	these	projects	were	hampered	by	challenges	to	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer.		Supporters	shared	their	frustrations.		Louis	Irwin	states,	“it	was	not	confusion	over	the	biochemical	identity	of	the	transfer	factors	or	the	debate	over	the	behavioral	specificity	of	the	effect	which	most	damaged	the	credibility	of	the	transfer	paradigm,	but	simply	the	unreliability	of	the	phenomenon”	(1978,	486).		Thus,	it	was	not	an	issue	with	determining	the	mechanistic	underpinnings	of	memory	transfer	that	doomed	the	research	program;	it	was	the	persistent	defeat	of	any	evidence	for	the	alleged	phenomenon.		Irwin	goes	on	to	say,	“the	phenomenon	was	by	no	means	universally	replicable,	and	many	labs…	failed	to	obtain	satisfactory	evidence	for	any	form	of	transfer”,	and	“even	for	the	proponents	of	the	transfer	phenomenon,	the	magnitude	of	the	effect	was	always	marginal”	(1978,	486).			 McConnell	turned	out	to	be	right	that	planarians	can	learn	(Rilling	1996),	though	his	protocol	was	not	sophisticated	enough	to	demonstrate	it.		Those	working	on	the	biochemistry	of	memory	started	again,	to	investigate	memory	without	the	baggage	of	memory	transfer.		Progress	in	this	field	was	made,	but	later	researchers	did	not	return	to	the	memory	transfer	research	of	the	1960s	and	the	1970s.		Today,	most	researchers	think	that	the	study	of	memory	transfer	was	flawed	(Setlow	1997),	and	any	transfer	phenomenon	that	might	exist	would	likely	have	a	very	different	characterization.				
4.	Rejecting	the	Characterization	of	a	Phenomenon		 Issues	with	the	experiments	whose	findings	were	thought	to	provide	support	for	the	characterization	of	the	purported	phenomenon	precipitated	the	abandonment	of	the	investigation	of	memory	transfer.		In	this	section,	I	analyze	what	issues	like	these	indicate	
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about	the	accuracy	of	a	characterization	of	a	phenomenon.		I	account	for	the	evidential	role	of	empirical	findings	in	characterizing	a	phenomenon,	and	explain	why	many	experiments	were	used	to	defeat	evidence	for	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer.		
4.1.	Why	Did	Researchers	Reject	the	Characterization	of	the	Phenomenon?		 Proponents	of	memory	transfer	faced	the	challenge	of	reported	failures	to	replicate	the	finding	when	the	reported	conditions	of	the	experiment	were	reproduced.		In	response,	the	supporters	developed	new	experiments,	but	were	unsuccessful:	additional	failures	to	replicate	were	reported,	which	themselves	replicated.		The	supporters	did	not	determine	if	the	phenomenon	occurs	under	a	more	constraining	set	of	conditions	than	originally	specified:	there	was	no	test	of	whether	memory	transfer	only	occurred	in	certain	organisms,	with	certain	learning	paradigms,	with	only	non-associative	forms	of	memory,	or	with	only	certain	associated	stimuli.		It	may	be	the	case	that	these	variables	must	be	held	fixed	for	memory	transfer	to	occur,	and	thus	should	have	to	be	included	in	the	characterization	to	delimit	the	conditions	under	which	the	phenomenon	occurs.			Failures	to	replicate	–	meaning	that	researchers	reproduce	the	reported	conditions	of	the	experiment,	but	not	the	result	–	suggest	that	there	is	issue	with	the	characterization	of	the	conditions	under	which	a	phenomenon	occurs.		The	findings	produced	in	the	original	experiment	may	be	due	to	conditions	that	were	not	reported	and	not	reproduced	in	the	replication	attempt.		As	a	result,	researchers	infer	that	the	characterization	fails	to	specify	the	conditions	that	precipitate	the	phenomenon,	or	it	fails	to	specify	some	conditions	that	inhibit	it.		As	unexplained	failures	become	more	common,	researchers’	skepticism	of	the	accuracy	of	characterization	of	the	phenomenon	grows,	which	is	one	reason	why	
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researchers	abandoned	memory	transfer.		The	characterization	of	memory	transfer	may	have	had	too	great	a	scope,	and	was	not	recharacterized	to	indicate	the	narrow	set	of	conditions	under	which	the	phenomenon	may	occur.			 In	addition,	there	was	the	issue	of	the	identification	of	confounds	in	memory	transfer	research.		These	confounds	were	not	thought	to	be	constitutive	of	the	phenomenon,	but	nevertheless	appeared	to	be	responsible	for	the	findings	thought	to	support	the	phenomenon’s	characterization.		McConnell	was	unable	to	develop	an	experiment	in	which	he	could	eliminate	sensitization,	Fjerdingstad	was	unable	to	eliminate	the	features	responsible	for	the	reversal	effect,	and	Ungar	was	unable	to	eliminate	individual	differences	between	his	experimental	subjects.		Skeptics	developed	experiments	that	suggested	that	these	features	might	be	responsible	for	the	findings	obtained	in	memory	transfer	experiments.		McConnell,	Fjerdingstad,	and	Ungar	may	have	discovered	real	phenomena,	but	these	phenomena	were	not	accurately	described	by	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer.			 The	identification	of	confounds	reveals	a	problem	with	the	characterization	of	the	features	thought	to	constitute	the	phenomenon.		In	normal	circumstances,	researchers	take	data,	the	empirical	findings	from	individual	experiments,	to	provide	a	basis	for	inferring	a	phenomenon	(Bogen	&	Woodward	1988).		The	occurrence	of	the	phenomenon	of	interest	is	taken	to	be	causally	responsible	for	the	data,	and	thus	the	data	reflect	the	phenomenon’s	features.		However,	if	there	is	a	known	confound	that	might	be	responsible	for	the	findings,	there	is	an	alternative	explanation	for	why	researcher	acquire	the	data	that	they	do,	undermining	the	inference	from	data	to	the	characteristics	of	the	phenomenon	of	interest.		Researchers	must	determine	whether	the	findings	are	indicative	of	the	occurrence	of	the	
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phenomenon	of	interest	or	of	the	feature	that	acts	as	a	confound.		Once	it	is	identified,	if	researchers	cannot	produce	consistent	findings	while	simultaneously	eliminating	the	presence	of	the	confound,	the	initial	findings	are	equivocal.			In	the	memory	transfer	case,	the	skeptics	produced	findings	consistent	with	those	from	McConnell’s	experiments	without	the	involvement	of	memory.		This	trend	continued	in	research	on	mammals:	confounds	were	identified,	sometimes	by	the	supporters	themselves.		To	restore	evidential	support	to	the	characterization	of	the	phenomenon,	supporters	had	to	either	eliminate	the	confounds	that	had	been	identified,	or	recharacterize	the	phenomenon	so	as	to	not	rule	out	that	something	aside	from	memory	transfer	may	be	responsible	for	their	findings.		The	supporters	were	unable	to	do	the	former,	and	unwilling	to	do	the	latter.		In	general,	as	a	result	of	the	identification	of	actual	confounds	relevant	to	experiments	in	which	positive	results	are	reported,	researchers’	skepticism	of	the	accuracy	of	the	characterization	of	the	phenomenon	grew.		This	is	another	reason	why	memory	transfer	was	abandoned.		The	characterization	of	memory	transfer	may	have	been	too	specific;	it	did	not	indicate	that	the	phenomenon	might	involve	the	interaction	of	different	sets	of	features,	each	of	which	was	consistent	with	the	experimental	results.		 Thus,	findings	from	multiple	experiments	provided	different	insight	regarding	the	accuracy	of	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer.		The	proponents	of	the	phenomenon	neither	resolved	the	issues	that	were	put	forward,	nor	modified	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer.		With	no	experimental	support	and	no	independent	theoretical	support,	there	was	no	reason	for	members	of	the	research	community	to	accept	the	phenomenon.		Thus,	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer	was	rejected.	
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4.2.	Why	Were	Researchers	Justified	in	Rejecting	the	Characterization	of	the	Phenomenon?	The	issues	I	have	presented	led	researchers	to	reject	memory	transfer.		However,	one	might	question	whether	or	not	researchers	were	epistemically	justified	in	their	rejection.		Collins	and	Pinch	deny	that	there	was	sufficient	reason	to	abandon	memory	transfer.		They	challenge	the	decisiveness	of	three	articles	they	argue	are	cited	as	providing	decisive	evidence	against	memory	transfer,	each	of	which	I	mention	in	Section	3:	the	failure	to	reproduce	planarian	learning	by	Bennett	and	Calvin	(1964),	the	failures	to	replicate	by	Byrne	and	colleagues	(1966),	and	the	reservations	of	Ungar’s	protocol	by	Stewart	(1972).		Collins	and	Pinch	note	that	these	publications	“seemed	decisive	at	the	time”,	but	“in	retrospect	they	seem	much	less	decisive”	(1998,	24).		Based	on	the	evidential	deficiencies	of	these	articles,	they	conclude:	A	determined	upholder	of	the	idea	[of	memory	transfer]	would	find	no	published	disproof	that	rests	on	decisive	technical	evidence.		For	such	a	person	it	would	not	be	unreasonable	or	unscientific	to	start	experimenting	once	more.		Each	negative	result	can	be	explained	away	while	many	of	the	positive	ones	have	not	been.		We	no	longer	believe	in	memory	transfer	but	this	is	because	we	tired	of	it,	because	more	interesting	problems	came	along,	and	because	the	principal	experimenters	lost	their	credibility.		Memory	transfer	was	never	quite	disproved;	it	just	ceased	to	occupy	the	scientific	imagination	(Collins	&	Pinch	1998,	25).				While	Collins	and	Pinch	do	not	characterize	what	counts	as	a	“disproof	that	rests	on	decisive	technical	evidence”,	their	position	can	be	inferred	from	their	discussion	of	the	limitations	of	the	three	articles.		They	note	that	each	article	targets	only	a	subset	of	the	empirical	research	on	memory	transfer.		They	claim	that	Bennett	and	Calvin’s	criticisms	of	planarian	learning	are	moot,	because	it	was	later	determined	that	planarians	can	learn,	and	their	criticisms	do	not	apply	to	experiments	that	involve	model	organisms	that	
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uncontroversially	express	associative	learning.		Likewise,	they	claim	that	the	failures	to	replicate	presented	by	Byrne	and	colleagues	are	irrelevant	to	research	by	Ungar,	because	his	protocols	were	different	than	those	developed	by	the	laboratory	of	Jacobson,	which	Byrne	and	colleagues	investigated.		They	address	no	specific	limitation	of	Stewart’s	article,	but	it	can	be	inferred	that	their	argument	is	based	on	the	fact	that	Stewart’s	reservations	only	apply	to	issues	with	Ungar’s	experiments.		Collins	and	Pinch’s	conclusion	can	be	read	in	two	different	ways.		It	may	be	the	case	that	their	argument	rests	on	the	fact	that	some	evidence	for	memory	transfer	was	not	“explained	away”.		However,	this	is	inconsistent	with	the	history	of	memory	transfer	research	I	have	presented:	every	major	experiment	thought	to	provide	support	for	memory	transfer	was	questioned	in	light	of	the	failures	to	replicate	and	the	identification	of	confounds,	and	other	reported	experiments	were	based	on	the	designs	of	the	major	ones.		Alternatively,	it	may	be	the	case	that	their	argument	rests	on	the	fact	that	the	criticisms	expressed	in	each	article	apply	only	to	certain	experiments	whose	findings	were	thought	to	provide	evidence	for	the	phenomenon	as	characterized.		No	criticism	applies	to	the	total	sum	of	empirical	research	on	memory	transfer.		Those	working	with	mammalian	model	organisms	“explained	away”	the	issues	with	planarian	experiments.		Ungar	“explained	away”	the	issues	with	experiments	that	did	not	involve	the	concentration	of	the	peptides	that	he	believed	to	underlie	the	memories	that	were	transferred.		It	can	be	inferred	that,	to	count	as	“disproof	that	rests	on	decisive	technical	evidence”,	researchers	must	demonstrate	an	issue	that	applies	to	all	experiments	whose	findings	are	thought	to	provide	evidential	support	for	memory	transfer.		Alternatively,	the	skeptics	must	put	forward	an	alternative	hypothesis	that	is	equally	well	supported	by	the	proponents’	empirical	findings,	and	can	be	
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tested	against	claims	about	memory	transfer	in	new	experiments.		This	corresponds	to	the	second	strategy	to	provide	reason	to	reject	a	characterization	of	memory	transfer	I	introduced	in	Section	2.		I	agree	with	this	reading	of	Collins	and	Pinch’s	argument:	the	challenges	to	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer	targeted	specific	features	of	individual	experiments,	none	of	which	can	be	applied	to	research	in	the	field	as	a	whole.		Likewise,	even	though	Collins	and	Pinch	fail	to	discuss	many	articles	critical	of	memory	transfer,	I	agree	that	no	critical	publication	describes	an	issue	that	applies	to	all	memory	transfer	experiments,	and	no	alternative	hypothesis	was	presented	that	is	equally	well	supported	by	the	empirical	findings.		However,	I	disagree	with	the	conclusion	that	Collins	and	Pinch	draw	from	these	facts.			 Researchers	were	justified	in	their	rejection	of	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer.	Skeptics	of	memory	transfer	targeted	the	individual	experiments	that	were	used	to	produce	the	results	that	ostensibly	demonstrated	the	phenomenon.		The	goal	of	the	skeptics	was	to	raise	issues	with	each	experiment	whose	findings	were	thought	to	provide	evidence	for	memory	transfer.		Their	strategy	thus	followed:	reproduce	the	experiments,	demonstrate	issues	with	the	experiments,	and	sever	the	evidential	relationship	between	the	findings	from	these	experiments	and	the	characterization	of	the	phenomenon	the	findings	were	taken	to	support.			The	skeptics	reproduced	the	experiments	in	order	to	determine	the	relationship	between	the	findings	that	were	initially	reported	and	the	phenomenon’s	characterization.		In	the	iterated	experiments,	they	determined	two	kinds	of	things	related	to	the	issues	in	Section	4.1.		First,	they	determined	that	the	experiments	did	not	produce	findings	
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consistent	with	the	features	described	in	the	characterization,	despite	the	fact	that	the	experiment	was	consistent	with	the	conditions	specified	in	the	characterization.		Second,	they	determined	that	the	experiments	involved	features	that	could	be	responsible	for	the	findings	produced	in	the	experiment,	despite	the	fact	that	those	features	were	not	included	in	the	characterization.		Both	issues	suggest	that	the	inference	thought	to	be	warranted	by	the	findings	from	the	original	experiments	–	that	they	had	demonstrated	the	phenomenon	–	is	not	warranted.			Aspects	of	the	skeptics’	strategy	can	be	compared	to	the	role	of	internalist	epistemic	defeaters	in	accounts	of	human	reasoning	and	the	analysis	of	knowledge.		Epistemologists	have	claimed	that	knowledge	claims	are	defeasible,	meaning	that	the	justification	for	a	knowledge	claim	can	be	defeated	by	the	acquisition	of	new	evidence	about	the	relationship	between	the	claim	and	what	is	thought	to	justify	it	(Chisholm	1966).		Likewise,	cognitive	scientists	characterize	the	architecture	of	reasoning	by	determining	the	reasons	individuals	have	for	belief	and	the	defeasibility	of	these	reasons.		A	succinct	characterization	of	defeaters	in	reasoning	comes	from	John	Pollock:	R	is	a	defeater	for	P	as	a	prima	facie	reason	for	Q	if	and	only	if	P	is	a	reason	for	S	to	believe	Q	and	R	is	logically	consistent	with	P	but	(P	&	R)	is	not	a	reason	for	S	to	believe	Q…	R	is	an	undercutting	defeater	for	P	as	a	prima	facie	reason	for	S	to	believe	Q	if	and	only	if	R	is	a	defeater	and	R	is	a	reason	for	denying	that	P	wouldn’t	be	true	unless	Q	were	true	(1987,	484-485,	my	emphasis).	If	an	individual	believes	a	conclusion	for	a	certain	reason,	an	undercutting	defeater	is	one	that	is	consistent	with	the	reason,	but	attacks	“the	connection	between	the	reason	and	the	conclusion”	(Pollock	1987,	485).		For	example,	the	belief	that	an	object	is	red	because	one	perceives	it	to	be	red	is	defeated	by	the	discovery	that	the	object	is	illuminated	by	a	red	light.		The	undercutting	defeater	does	not	entail	that	the	object	is	not	red,	but	it	is	a	reason	
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to	deny	that	it	would	not	look	red	unless	it	were	actually	red.		In	this	way,	it	defeats	the	evidential	relationship	between	the	conclusion	and	the	reason	provided	to	support	the	conclusion.				 The	idea	of	undercutting	defeaters	can	be	applied	to	the	strategy	of	characterizing	phenomena.		Researchers	accept	characterizations	of	phenomena	upon	the	assessment	of	empirical	findings	that	are	taken	to	support	these	characterizations.		This	is	because	the	occurrence	of	the	phenomenon	is	thought	to	be	responsible	for	the	findings	that	researchers	acquire.		Undercutting	defeaters	undermine	the	evidential	relationship	between	findings	and	a	characterization.		They	provide	reason	to	think	that	the	occurrence	of	the	phenomenon	may	not	be	responsible	for	the	findings	initially	taken	to	support	its	characterization.		Researchers	who	are	skeptical	of	a	phenomenon’s	characterization	can	actively	seek	to	determine	whether	or	not	there	are	undercutting	defeaters	for	the	findings	that	are	thought	to	support	the	characterization.		To	the	extent	that	they	can	discover	defeaters,	they	can	undermine	inferring	the	phenomenon	from	the	empirical	findings	thought	to	support	it.		This	is	the	defeater	strategy.		 Skeptical	researchers	employed	the	defeater	strategy	to	systematically	undermine	all	empirically	motivated	reason	to	accept	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer.		The	undercutting	defeaters	in	this	case	were	the	findings	related	to	the	failures	to	replicate,	and	the	findings	related	to	the	identification	of	confounds.		Each	set	of	negative	findings	is	an	undercutting	defeater	for	evidence	for	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer,	as	each	provides	reason	to	think	that	the	features	or	conditions	specified	in	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer	may	not	be	responsible	for	the	experimental	findings	thought	to	support	its	characterization.		Every	major	memory	transfer	experiment	was	challenged,	and	every	
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reported	positive	finding	was	undercut	by	identified	confounds	and	failures	to	replicate.		Thus,	for	every	finding	thought	to	provide	evidence	for	memory	transfer,	an	undercutting	defeater	was	presented.		Each	defeater	relates	to	a	particular	experimental	attempt	to	demonstrate	memory	transfer.		However,	as	a	collection,	the	defeaters	provide	sufficient	reason	to	think	that	there	was	no	undefeated	empirical	evidence	to	accept	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer.		It	was	not	merely	the	possibility	of	defeaters	that	undercuts	evidence	for	the	characterization	of	the	memory	transfer,	as	all	empirical	evidence	is	defeasible.		It	was	the	actual	collection	of	findings	that	are	undercutting	defeaters	of	evidence	for	a	characterization	of	memory	transfer	that	plays	this	role.			The	defeater	strategy	was	appropriate	in	a	case	like	memory	transfer.		This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	many	experiments	were	performed	in	the	various	memory	transfer	projects,	whose	findings	were	thought	to	provide	evidence	for	memory	transfer.		The	experiments	were	different,	involving	both	differences	in	protocol	and	model	organism.		Skeptics	suggested	alternative	explanations	for	the	positive	findings,	but	these	explanations	were	sensitive	to	particular	aspects	of	the	protocol	or	organism	involved.		Thus,	the	issues	related	to	McConnell’s	protocols	were	very	different	than	the	issues	related	to	the	work	of	Ungar,	Jacobson,	Rosenblatt,	or	Fjerdingstad.		The	fact	that	there	was	not	a	single	factor	that	was	responsible	for	all	previous	findings	means	that	skeptical	researchers	were	not	able	to	develop	an	experiment	that	proved	that	any	single	factor,	rather	than	the	occurrence	of	memory	transfer,	was	responsible	for	all	findings.		Instead,	they	challenged	each	experiment	thought	to	demonstrate	the	phenomenon	individually,	and	undercut	every	empirical	finding	thought	to	support	its	characterization.	
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Collins	and	Pinch	are	right	that	it	would	not	be	unscientific	for	researchers	to	begin	again	to	search	for	memory	transfer.		Analogous	to	the	fact	that	an	undercutting	defeater	does	not	entail	the	falsity	of	the	conclusion	whose	reason	is	undercut,	defeaters	do	not	rule	out	the	possibility	that	there	exists	a	phenomenon	with	features	in	the	vague	vicinity	of	what	had	been	characterized.		However,	there	is	no	reason	to	accept	that	the	phenomenon	occurs	as	characterized.		More	importantly,	it	would	be	unscientific	to	use	the	very	same	experiments	described	by	supporters	of	memory	transfer	to	rekindle	investigation,	due	to	issues	with	the	reported	conditions	and	identified	confounds.		It	would	take	new	techniques	and	protocols	to	renew	the	search	for	a	phenomenon	that	is	something	like	memory	transfer.				 The	defeater	strategy	employed	in	research	on	memory	transfer	reflects	a	more	general	characterization	of	when	researchers	have	reason	to	reject	the	characterization	of	a	scientific	phenomenon	despite	evidence	that	initially	appears	to	support	it.		A	characterization	of	a	phenomenon	ought	to	be	accepted	if	there	are	empirical	findings	that	provide	reason	to	support	it.		If	undercutting	defeaters	challenge	the	evidential	role	of	the	findings	for	the	characterization	of	the	phenomenon	in	question,	and	experiments	that	were	thought	to	demonstrate	the	phenomenon	are	equivocal,	then	the	empirical	support	for	the	characterization	is	reduced.		If	the	empirical	findings	provide	reason	to	accept	the	phenomenon	as	characterized,	then	it	ought	to	be	rejected	if	this	reason	is	undermined.		The	effectiveness	of	the	defeater	strategy	rests	on	challenging	a	characterization	of	a	phenomenon	by	providing	reason	to	think	that	the	experiments	whose	findings	are	thought	to	provide	support	for	the	characterization	are	faulty,	and	lack	the	requisite	sophistication	to	infer	the	occurrence	of	a	phenomenon	from	its	findings.		More	than	providing	evidence	
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against	the	accuracy	of	the	characterization	of	a	phenomenon,	this	strategy	provides	a	means	to	challenge	evidence	put	forward	in	the	characterization’s	favor.		
5.		Conclusion	In	this	paper,	I	have	analyzed	an	episode	from	the	history	of	science	in	which	there	was	a	rejection	of	the	characterization	of	a	scientific	phenomenon	despite	initially	promising	empirical	findings.		Proponents	of	memory	transfer	produced	findings	that	were	thought	to	support	the	characterization	of	the	phenomenon.		The	issues	with	the	experiments	in	which	the	findings	were	produced	ultimately	precipitated	the	rejection	of	the	phenomenon	as	characterized.		The	experimental	strategy	employed	by	skeptics	of	the	reality	of	the	alleged	phenomenon	exploited	the	defeasible	evidential	relationship	between	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer	that	proponents	accepted,	and	the	empirical	findings	that	served	as	reasons	to	accept	it.		My	analysis	of	the	memory	transfer	case	provides	a	novel	way	to	think	about	the	assessment	of	scientific	evidence.		New	experimental	findings	can	defeat	the	evidence	provided	for	a	characterization	of	a	phenomenon.		This	provides	reason	to	reject	the	characterization,	even	if,	as	Collins	and	Pinch	note,	no	one	of	the	new	experiments	is	individually	decisive.		
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Appendix	
	
Table	1:	Articles	that	support	or	challenge	the	characterization	of	memory	transfer.		
	
Citation	 Empirical	Findings	 Relation	to	
Memory	Transfer	McConnell	(1962)	
	
Report	of	successful	transfer	of	learned	memory	in	planarian	worms,	using	an	associative	learning	paradigm	and	cannibalism		 Supports	Halas,	James,	&	Stone	(1961)	 Report	of	potential	issues	with	memory	association	paradigm	from	McConnell	1962	 Ambiguous	Halas,	James,	&	Knutson	(1962)	 Report	of	failure	to	engage	planarian	worms	in	associative	learning	paradigm	from	McConnell	1962	 Challenges	Bennett	&	Calvin	(1964)	 Report	of	failure	to	engage	planarian	worms	in	associative	learning	paradigm	from	McConnell	1962	 Challenges	Babich	et	al.	(1965)	 Report	of	memory	transfer	in	rats,	using	a	Skinnerian	learning	paradigm	and	injection	of	neural	tissue		 Supports	Nissen,	Røigaard-Petersen,	&	Fjerdingstad	(1965)	 Report	of	memory	transfer	in	rats,	using	a	reinforcement	learning	paradigm	and	injection	of	neural	tissue;	identification	of	reversal	effect	 Ambiguous	Walker	(1966)	 Report	of	confound	of	sensitization	in	protocol	presented	in	McConnell	1962	 Challenges	Walker	&	Milton	(1966)	 Report	of	confound	of	sensitization	in	protocol	presented	in	McConnell	1962	 Challenges	Rosenblatt,	Farrow,	&	Herblin	(1966)	 Report	of	memory	transfer	in	rats,	using	a	Skinnerian	learning	paradigm	and	injection	of	neural	tissue		 Supports	Rosenblatt,	Farrow,	&	Rhine	(1966a)	 Report	of	memory	transfer	in	rats,	using	a	Skinnerian	learning	paradigm	and	injection	of	neural	tissue;	replication	of	Babich	et	al.	1965	 Supports	Rosenblatt,	Farrow,	&	Rhine	(1966b)	 Report	of	memory	transfer	in	rats,	using	a	Skinnerian	learning	paradigm	and	injection	of	neural	tissue	 Supports	Byrne	et	al.	(1966)	 Report	of	failure	to	replicate	memory	transfer	protocol	presented	in	Babich	et	al.	1965	 Challenges	Røigaard-Petersen,	Nissen,	&	Fjerdingstad	(1968)		 Report	of	memory	transfer	in	rats,	using	a	reinforcement	learning	paradigm	and	injection	of	neural	tissue;	modification	to	protocol	in	response	to	Byrne	et	al.	1966;	replication	of	reversal	effect	
Ambiguous	
Ungar	(1970)		 Summary	of	reports	of	memory	transfer,	using	a	reinforcement	and	Skinnerian	learning	paradigm	and	injection	of	neural	tissue	 Supports	Goldstein,	Sheehan,	&	Goldstein	(1971)		 Report	of	failure	to	replicate	memory	transfer	protocol	presented	in	Ungar	1970	 Challenges	Krech	&	Bennett	(1971)	 Report	of	failure	to	replicate	memory	transfer	protocol	presented	in	Ungar	1970	 Challenges	Ungar,	Desiderio,	&	Parr	(1972)		 Report	of	memory	transfer	in	rats,	using	a	reinforcement	learning	paradigm	and	injection	of	neural	tissue	 Supports		
